How 2024 reordered the Middle East

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The author is director of regional security at the International Institute for Strategic Studies and co-editor of the recently published ‘Turbulence in the Eastern Mediterranean: Geopolitical, Security and Energy Dynamics’

If ever there was a time to use the hype about Middle Eastern affairs, it’s 2024. The cascade of events that began in October 2023 was nothing short of startling. If the ephemeral mix of dramatic, spectacular and strategic episodes takes time to settle, what has already happened will undoubtedly have a lasting impact.

Diverse and already fragile Levantine societies are undergoing drastic historical changes. In doing so, they are unlikely to receive much external help, given both local reluctance and global exhaustion. The realignment of territory is accompanied by great violence and renewed competition.

Palestinians are suffering unprecedentedly in Gaza at the hands of the Israeli military. Hamas’ failed bloody bet, and the inability of its partners to come to the rescue, is a reminder, if necessary, that the only path to Palestinian statehood is its internationalization and a negotiated outcome. A coalition for a two-state solution organized by Saudi Arabia, other Arab states and European countries has emerged as the most likely vehicle for this. The Palestinians must be convinced that this is more than a symbolic diplomatic dance but that they must demonstrate ownership of the process, which will lead to a long-awaited reform of the Palestinian Authority. However, such aspirations remain exposed to Israeli condescension and the potential wrath of Donald Trump.

In parallel, Israeli society went from extreme trauma to military victory in just one year. It has reinforced the belief that Israel can only rely on its military might and that expansionism in Gaza, the occupied West Bank and now southern Syria is not only justified but necessary. The unconditional support Israel received from the United States and several European states allowed it to dismiss the need for a just peace that would provide security for all.

But this security-only mentality has perverse consequences. It is expensive, it increases dependence on the United States, and it alienates existing and existing partners in the neighborhood, who fear that Israel will escalate the conflict by striking Iran’s leadership and nuclear facilities. The reputational damage of the Gaza war is immense and there are legal responsibilities. The authority of Benjamin Netanyahu and his radical acolytes appears to be secure as internal rifts persist over the nature of the Israeli state.

For the Lebanese, an opposite dynamic is at play. An elite Hezbollah must reckon with the decline of its military strategy, ideological narrative and overall credibility. Reviving its policy of deterrence is a tall order to lick its deep wounds, the sudden loss of Syria and the terrible system of its constituencies. Many Lebanese who sense an opportunity face two opposing forces: They understand they will not have much chance to reform their state but they also recognize the danger of provoking a wounded Hezbollah, which could ignite domestic strife.

After all, Syrians have their first taste of freedom after decades of oppression. The decay of the Assad regime allowed for its swift fall, without the horrific scenes of mass sectarian violence. Instead, the new Islamist administration in Damascus has shown restraint and some wisdom. But inclusive governance will require huge achievements and dedication despite internal and external losses to maintain peace.

At the very least, Syrians can take pleasure in the fact that they have exposed the flaws in realpolitik. It is a stark irony that a decade ago most Arab and Western nations wanted the Assad regime to end but Syrians were divided. By early December, many Arab and Western states wanted Assad to stay but the Syrians were largely united to push for internal change. They now need foreign goodwill. Turkish mediation and US diplomacy will be crucial in reaching an Arab-Kurdish settlement. To reassure the Alawite community, Russian mediation may help. Gulf states can help neutralize Iran’s influence.

In all of these, Iran is undeniably the loser. It partners with militias to increase its influence in fractured states and divided societies. It expected these groups to advance its interests, instead it was drawn into the wars they started. Türkiye took advantage, surpassing Tehran in Syria, the region’s central geopolitical arena.

Many in Western capitals will take solace in the fact that so far, these historic transformations have been surprisingly contained. No massive immigration crisis, no protracted state wars, no major terrorist attacks, no lasting impact on oil prices, no consequential disruptions to global trade. It is this complacency that paves the way for unexpected surprises.